a proxy SVAR approach by Sousa, Rui
A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Master’s Degree in Economics from
NOVA – School of Business and Economics.
The Macroeconomic Impact of ECB’s Large Scale
Asset Purchases:
A Proxy SVAR Approach
Rui Afonso Gomes Moreira de Sousa
Student number 27158
A project carried out on the Master in Economics Program,
under the supervision of:
Professor Joa˜o Bernardo Duarte
4th of January, 2019
Abstract
I study the ECB’s policy announcement effects in various assets in order to assess how
many distinct information dimensions are systematically assimilated. Wielding the zero
lower bound, I isolate non-standard measures from conventional monetary policy, inef-
fective since 2016. Transforming these into an external instrument for a SVAR Model, I
conclude that expanding the overall central bank’s balance sheet increases consumer prices
while production may remain unaffected. I find that both the exchange rate and long term
yields depress as a result. Notwithstanding, credit conditions do not benefit from this. Fi-
nally, both equity returns and expectations fall whereas market volatility rises.
JEL Codes: E31, E44, E52, E58.
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1 Introduction
The resort to non-standard monetary policy measures by several central banks around the world
has generated controversy on their effectiveness among researchers and practitioners alike. The
European Central Bank (ECB) in particular has been legally challenged over several asset pur-
chase programmes. Despite having won most of these legal fights, the disapproval of these
measures is driven by the uncertainty surrounding their effects. Theory has provided several
examples on how these measures can successfully increase prices, but does, nevertheless, also
leave room for possible ineffectiveness. Furthermore, the set of potential transmission channels
is vast and each one of these may have different economic consequences (see Joyce et al. (2012)
for an introduction). As such, it is of vital importance to understand if these measures can be
confidently added to a central banks’ tool-set. More specifically, it is mandatory that we under-
stand the full economic consequences of the already implemented policies in the eurozone.
The literature has divided non-standard measures into three categories (Bernanke et al.,
2004), namely: communication policies steering expectations, the composition and the size of
the central bank’s balance sheet. For our macroeconomic analysis we focus on the latter, the
one less explored but with the most potential for contribution without access to proprietary data.
Consequently, using a SVAR model identified through external information, I provide ev-
idence that increasing the ECB’s balance sheet increases consumer prices in the euro area,
nonetheless, output may remain completely unchanged. In fact, credit does not appear to ben-
efit from these measures. Neither the volume nor the cost of credit suffer any change from
an unexpected structural large scale asset purchase. Moreover, financial markets become more
volatile while both financial sector and overall eurozone stocks’ market returns decrease. On
top of this, business expectations deteriorate while inflation expectations do not significantly
rise. Lastly, we can notice that both the long term risk free interest rate and exchange rates
decrease as a result of these policies.
Most of the ECB’s information on monetary measures is conveyed during their regular pol-
icy announcements. As soon as these actions are revealed, the information should have an
impact on agents’ behaviour. As a result, they provide an extensive field of opportunities to
assess the consequences of the different measures imposed. Following the literature on central
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banking communication (see Blinder et al. (2008)), we build on past work and construct a way
of extracting information from these events. As such, by making use of the bank’s effective
zero lower bound, we provide a structural interpretation to the statistical decomposition con-
ducted, successfully extracting information on at least part of the non-standard actions intended
to affect longer term interest rates, as interpreted by financial markets.
As a follow up, I construct an instrumental variable which proves useful for use in an ex-
ternal identification strategy for a simple SVAR model. Despite the strict assumptions, this
methodology avoids the use of narrative strategies1.
In sum, this work contributes twofold to the existing literature. Firstly, I assess the number
of systematic dimensions needed to describe asset movements during ECB’s post-crisis policy
announcements, while constructing a new strategy to structurally interpret them. Secondly, I
show that this methodology’s results are useful also for assessing the macroeconomic effects
of non-standard monetary measures, providing evidence contradicting previous works’ conclu-
sions of improved expectations, credit conditions as well as higher equity prices, as a result of
a balance sheet expansion.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents a brief literature review on
relevant past work. Section 3 details the econometric framework, followed by the construction
of an external instrument in section 4. Section 5 presents the data and estimation results on the
macroeconomic analysis while section 6 provides some concluding remarks.
2 Literature Review
This section begins by presenting an overview of the literature on financial assets’ responses to
unconventional monetary policy and finishes by delving into the empirical work assessing the
real effects of central bank’s asset purchases.
1Questionable given the particular uncertainty surrounding the topic.
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2.1 Market Responses to Unconventional Monetary Policy
This work’s outcome encompasses two seemingly distinct strands of literature on monetary pol-
icy in the euro area. The first assesses how financial markets react to unconventional monetary
policy and is, therefore, related to the financial economics literature. The second inspects the
macroeconomic effects of increasing a central bank’s balance sheet size.
Starting with the former, most work has relied upon event studies on days of policy an-
nouncements, inspecting the reactions of asset values around a relatively narrow time window
on these particular dates. Its reasoning follows from the objective of determining the causal im-
pact of non-standard measures, whose information is firstly conveyed during policy announce-
ments, on financial markets. As such, by restricting the sample one is able to isolate financial
asset movements from other confounding factors. Additionally, the potential problem of endo-
geneity is absent since no space is given for the central bank to react.
These approaches require a narrative selection of the relevant days for analysis. Motto et al.
(2015) include both ECB’s press conferences and the president’s topic related speeches on their
set of events. The broad group of dates implies the need to control for other macroeconomic
news, as these may also have an impact on asset prices. Their use of event dummy regressions
is, nevertheless, prone to criticism. Asset movements must uniquely reflect new and unexpected
facts since all other pre-available information must have been priced in already. As such, what
may be an expansionary policy can still result in a negative market reaction. As long as the pol-
icy falls short of their expectations, the changes in values will not reflect the true nature of the
central bank’s actions. In more practical terms, this may bias the results to the point of estab-
lishing the incorrect causal relationship between policies and asset movements, specially given
their non-discriminatory use of all press conferences. Fratzscher et al. (2016) treat non-standards
policies slightly differently. They too use event dummy regressions for policy announcements
but select just a handful of events, with a significant and proven enough magnitude, that faced
little to no anticipation by the markets. In contrast, they create a surprise indicator for two other
specific policies, liquidity injections and the securities market programme. For the former, they
resort to an indicator that assesses loan expansions in a 7 day window around their respective
auctions. For the latter, they construct a bank’s reaction function to identify exogenous changes
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in bond purchases for a given week. Both works find evidence for a decrease in sovereign
yields, credit spreads and a rise in both inflation expectations and equity markets as a result of
the policies. Contrarily, they do not find consensual results regarding the the exchange rate.
Varghese and Zhang (2018) in turn, attempt to avoid the dummy regression’s pitfall by
constructing a measure that captures only the unexpected changes in policy. They do so by
estimating two factors that describe a portfolio of sovereign yields’ individual reactions on days
of announcements and rotate them using the varimax method. Despite having no structural
interpretation whatsoever, they find that one factor loads more on short term yields while the
other loads more on longer term ones. In addition, they observe that the latter is more active
after the implementation of quantitative easing. They, therefore, naturally interpret them as
being depicting of conventional and unconventional monetary policy, respectively. Ultimately,
their work yields similar results to the two previous papers and records a meaningful reaction
for the exchange rate.
2.2 Non-standard Measures and the Macroeconomy
Only until recently have empirical macroeconomists had a sufficiently high sample to study the
systematic implementation of asset purchases in the euro area.
As such, a big deal of work focuses on specific non-standard programmes. Gambetti and
Musso (2017) assess the impact of the 2015 extended asset purchase programme while Wieladek
and Pascual (2016), following the methodology of Weale and Wieladek (2016), study how quan-
titative easing has impacted the eurozone’s aggregate macroeconomy from 2012 to 2016. Both
studies rely on Bayesian VARs with non-informative priors while the former also uses a time-
varying parameter model with stochastic volatility. This latter methodology proves useful in
taking into account the structural changes occurring in the economy, as well as the more tumul-
tuous periods during the sample. To circumvent the lack of data Gambacorta et al. (2014) take
an alternative route, estimating a panel VAR that captures the cross sectional variation in the
economic impact of an expansion in a central bank’s balance sheet.
Wieladek and Pascual (2016) use as the indicator variable a non-decreasing series of the
total amount of euro area sovereign debt purchases, announced at each ECB’s policy meeting,
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scaled by the euro area’s GDP. Alternatively, the other two works choose the amount of total
assets in the central bank’s balance sheet.
All their methodologies rely on a mixture of zero and sign restrictions in order to identify
their models and assess the effect of an expansionary purchasing policy. These strategies first
drawback is failing to take into account expectations on monetary actions. As one will see
further along this work, several negative financial markets’ reactions may occur even when
policy announcements are deemed expansionary.
Wieladek and Pascual (2016) use two identification strategies. Both assume equity prices
and asset purchases increase while one of them adds that long term interest rates should de-
crease, both on impact and for the following 5 months. Gambetti and Musso (2017) assume an
increase of the balance sheet size and a decrease on impact of sovereign yields, persisting for
three more quarters. Moreover, they assume a positive impact on both output and prices with
one, two and/or three lags. Finally, Gambacorta et al. (2014) set an expansion of the balance
sheet, a zero response on impact for both prices and output and exclude a possible rise in market
volatility. Most of these restrictions, even if heavily based on economic theory, do not allow for
a first agnostic assessment of non-standard measures’ real impact, further motivating my work.
Their results show an increase in both output and prices but with various degrees of persis-
tence. On average, though, output growth tends to be shortly lived, while the increase in prices
tends to persist for longer. Contrarily, the persistence of the long term interest rate’s depression
has a higher variability among studies.
Finally, those inspecting transmissions mechanisms conclude for the existence of a portfolio
rebalancing, exchange rate, inflation expectations and signalling channels. Surprisingly, those
who leave it unconstrained also find an increase in uncertainty after the implementation of
unconventional monetary policy, as portrayed by financial markets’ volatility.
3 Econometric Framework
In this short section, following Stock and Watson (2016), I start by presenting the simple struc-
tural vector auto-regression, ultimately used for assessing the effects of large scale asset pur-
chases, and finish by explaining how identification proceeds using an external instrument.
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3.1 The Structural Vector Auto-regression Model
In order to study the effects of monetary policy, one must be capable of capturing the structural
co-movement of economic variables to, therefore, identify exogenous changes to the economic
system. The vector auto-regression (VAR) framework does just that, thus, allowing the re-
searcher to observe how an economic environment naturally reacts to an unforeseeable shock.
That being said, consider Xt to be a column vector of n economic variables at time t. The
VAR model is depicted by the following equation:
Xt = µ+Γ1Xt−1 + ...+ΓpXt−p+ζt , (1)
where ζt is a column vector of n innovations, p is the number of lags in the model, Γp an
n× n matrix of parameters and µ a column vector of n intercepts. Equation (1) is called the
reduced-form VAR. It can be equivalently represented as
Φ(L)Xt−µ = ζt , (2)
where Φ(L) is an n× n matrix of lag polynomials of order p. The model, thus, describes a
random-variable’s mean process as being a function of other variables’ realizations and lagged
values of the system. Additionally, all variables are assumed second order stationary and inte-
grated of order zero. Without making any distributional assumptions about the reduced-form
errors, the model may be suitably estimated using ordinary least squares.
Since we are interested in the structural shocks εi,t we need to represent Xt not in terms of
its reduced-form errors but as a function of the underlying uncorrelated structural innovations,
Σε = diag(σ2ε1, ...,σ
2
εk). (3)
From the general structural VAR model, there is a linear relationship between the reduced-form
errors and the structural shocks,
ζt = Hεt , (4)
where H is an n× n matrix and εt is a column vector of n structural shocks. Using the addi-
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tional assumption of invertibility, standard in the literature, the structural shocks can then be
represented as a linear transformation of the reduced-form errors,
H−1ζt = εt , (5)
and we may assess how the system reacts to any unexpected change.
3.2 External Identification
SVAR models suffer from a well known problem of identification, i.e., of retrieving matrix H
from the reduced-form estimates. The most sought after solution is to impose internal restric-
tions to the model, most notably, sign or timing restrictions. Even at a monthly frequency the
endogenous behaviour of an economic system, to which the central bank belongs to, does not
allow one to plausibly define which economic variables inertially react to others, invalidating
the latter approach. Sign and zero restrictions, in turn, require complete certainty about the
quantitative evolution of some specific variables in reaction to a large scale asset purchase. The
literature cannot have such conviction yet since, as argued before, not only does theory not grant
us assurance of its effectiveness but there can also be a multitude of mechanisms at play.
With an alternative approach in mind, Montiel Olea et al. (2012) propose to use information
not embedded in the model. In practice, this strategy works by using some variable as a proxy
for the structural shock of interest. Consequently, in order to estimate (part of) matrix H, we
only require a single instrumental variable, Zt , also referred to as an external instrument2. To
be suitable, the instrument must respect two assumptions, common to those familiar with the
microeconometric literature:
1. Relevance: E(Ztε1t) = α 6= 0
2. Exogeneity: E(Ztε jt) = 0, j = 2, ...,k.
These amount to having an instrument correlated with the structural shock of interest, ε1, but
uncorrelated with the other structural shocks.
2The term external derives from its exterior origin to the model.
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Given that we are solely interested in identifying a single unanticipated structural distur-
bance, the balance sheet expansion, we just require part of H to be known, namely its first
column3. Partion H into its first column, H1, and the remaining, H−1, and write
E(ζtZ′t) = E(HεtZ
′
t) =
[
H1 H−1
] E(ε1tZ′t)
E(ε−1tZ′t)
= H1α ′, (6)
where we have used equation (4) for the first equality and the two assumptions of the instru-
mental variable for the last. We may now note that the regression of the instrument on the
reduced-form innovations identifies the structural shock of interest up to a constant. Note that
we may normalize H’s first entry to one. This is denoted as a unit normalization and fixes the
sign and scale of the first shock such that a unit increase in ε1t increases ζ1t by one unit. We can
now rewrite the last equality as
H1α ′ =
[
α ′ H ′−1,1α
′
]′
, (7)
where H−1,1 is the column vector which excludes the first entry of H1. Consequently, we obtain
H1,
H−1,1 =
E(ζ1tZ′t)
E(ζ−1tZ′t)
. (8)
On top of its interpretational advantages, Stock and Watson (2016) point out that this unit nor-
malization further decreases potential inferential error when computing the structural impulse
response functions. Without loss of generality, we may disregard the mean µ and define these
using equations (2) and (4):
Xt =Φ(L)−1H1εt + et . (9)
As can be concluded, the success of this approach relies heavily on the ability to find rele-
vant and credibly exogenous instrument(s). The literature already has some examples covering
mostly conventional policy, but has still failed to properly construct one which isolates non-
standard measures. I attempt to do so in the next section.
3We need to order first the variable whose shock we are interest in.
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4 External Instrument
In this section I start by providing a brief overview of the ECB’s post-crisis policy history,
following Micossi (2015), succeeded by an analysis of the ECB’s press releases. I then construct
the external instrument and finish by validating the series generated through the inspection of
some financial assets’ responses.
4.1 Extracting Information from ECB’s Announcements
The European Central Bank has been regularly resorting to non-standard measures of monetary
policy ever since the beginning of the financial crisis. Around that time, the central bank intro-
duced credit enhancement policies, such as increased maturities for refinancing operations with
full allotment, and the first covered bond purchase programme, aimed at maintaining liquidity
in the interbank and financial markets. Sequentially, during the turbulent times of the sovereign
debt crisis in the euro area, the ECB launched a series of asset purchase4 programmes to restore
markets’ depth and liquidity. Notwithstanding, the subsequent banking crisis required a mix of
conventional and non-standard monetary measures as portrayed by, for example, the decrease
of official refinancing interest rates or by furthering their respective term of operations, respec-
tively. After these unsettling periods, poor macroeconomic outlooks and deflationary pressures
set the stage for further use of non-standard measures, now with the intent of stimulating the
economy and raising inflation. Consequently, the central bank started to further quantitative
easing policies, more meaningfully after 2015, continued to decrease official rates and gave a
much more important role to steering expectations, providing forward guidance to the markets
on their future policies. As a result of this tumultuous period, the central bank’s balance sheet
rose from around 190 thousand million euros in total assets in early 2007 to around 2704 thou-
sand million euros in the third quarter of 2018. With this in mind, it is easy to conclude that
both conventional and unconventional mechanisms, in particular balance sheet size measures,
were systematically at play during the period described.
That being said, the literature on monetary policy communication is particularly interested
in understanding how central banks’ information is conveyed to the public. The core of this re-
4In secondary markets.
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lationship is composed of two parts. The first is related to central bank’s communication inten-
tions, i.e., what type of message it is trying to convey to the public. Oppositely, its counterpart is
related to how agents actually interpret this information. Surprisingly enough, Gu¨rkaynak et al.
(2005) - GSS hereafter - show that, in the US, the somewhat complex responses of a variety
of financial assets in days of policy announcements can be well described using a very reduced
number of common drivers. To achieve such conclusion, the athors test for the number of di-
mensions necessary to describe the individual movement of a group of financial assets around
policy announcement days. Broadly speaking, this statistical decomposition characterizes the
number of distinct information factors markets systematically internalize from these events. I
here replicate that same approach to understand how markets react to the ECB’s regular policy
announcements.
Take Y to be a T × s matrix representing the bundle of s financial assets5. The factor model
can be depicted by the following equation:
X = FΛ′+ψ, (10)
where Λ is an s× k matrix of factor loadings, F is a matrix of T × k unobserved factors and
ψ is a T × s matrix of idiosyncratic components. The unobserved factors can be estimated us-
ing non-parametric methods such as that of principal components, which do not assume any
specific distribution for the disturbances. The use of cross-sectional averaging removes the in-
fluence of the idiosyncratic errors and leaves only the variation associated with the common
factors6. Consequently, estimation proceeds in two steps. Firstly, one retrieves the k largest
eigenvectors, in descending order, of the covariance matrix of Y , thus, obtaining the loadings
matrix. Hence, normalization Λ′Λ = Ik, which is arbitrary and entails no economic interpreta-
tion, is used inconsequently. Secondly, one multiplies the loadings matrix by the data to obtain
the unobserved components.
We set out to test how many unobserved factors are necessary to describe Y well up to an
idiosyncratic disturbance. The statistical tool used is that of Cragg and Donald (1997)’s matrix
5Suitably normalized to have unit variance.
6This approach estimates the factors consistently up to a pre-multiplication by an arbitrary k×k rotation matrix.
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rank test. It tests the null hypothesis that Y is well described by k0 unobserved factors against
the alternative of kA > k0 factors. In short, the algorithm starts by finding the minimum distance
between the covariance matrix of the data and that of a model with k0 factors. Remember that
this entails searching over all possible factor loadings for the model. Under the null hypothesis
this is a Wald statistic with limiting χ2 distribution7.
The bundle is comprised of nine financial assets. An euro area broad equity index, STOXX50,
an investment grade fixed-rate euro area bond option adjusted spread index, LECPOAS, the one,
five and ten-year German bond yields index, the one-year inflation swaps index8 and the one,
six and twelve-month euro overnight index average (eonia) swaps index. The series span from
January 2008 to March 2018, amounting to 111 press releases, and extends the corresponding
list of events from Corsetti et al. (2018), hence, capturing the period described before, when
non-standard measures were used systematically. All data was retrieved from Bloomberg.
The ECB’s policy information releases occur in two parts. At 13:45 CET, they convey a
limited amount of information on their latest policy actions. Not only but most importantly,
they indicate the marginal refinancing operation, deposit facility and marginal facility rates.
Later, at 14:30 CET, there is a press conference and Q&A session with the President, which
normally lasts an hour. Following the previously explained reasoning, the event window should
roughly span this intra-day period. Problematic, nevertheless, is the process of retrieving intra-
day data. As such, with the exception of the equity index, all the market reactions are computed
as the difference between the closing and opening9 values on event days. In turn, for the stock
index, we use the difference between the index value at 16:00 CET and 12:35 CET. Intra-day
data on this index is available on Bloomberg only from 2008 onwards. Notwithstanding, GSS
find evidence that this does not pose a significant limitation to the analysis at hand. Once more,
with the exception of stocks, the other assets’ responses tend to be slower and the results remain
relatively similar when using either smaller or relatively wider event windows.
Following up, not only does the rank test vehemently reject the hypothesis that there are
no systematic responses to policy announcements but it also presents statistical evidence, at a
7See Gurkaynak et al. (2005) for more details
8Represents the fixed leg yield of the trade.
9When not available, the previous trading day’s closing ’price’ is used.
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10% significance level, of requiring only 3 factors to systematically describe the data up to an
idiosyncratic disturbance:
Null Hypothesis: k0 = 0 k0 = 1 k0 = 2 k0 = 3 k0 = 4
Alternative Hypothesis: kA > 0 kA > 1 kA > 2 kA > 3 kA > 4
P-value: 0.000 0.012 0.055 0.169 0.425
These results, however, are not completely robust to the inclusion of more assets. On the one
hand, we consistently find evidence for more than two latent factors. This leads us to conclude
that more than conventional monetary policy is at action during this period. On the other, the
number of factors oscilates between three and four10. These observations corroborate GSS’s
statement that adding strongly correlated assets produces additional factors, even though their
variation may be orthogonal to that of others. Likewise, these assets were individually cho-
sen so as to depict a comprehensive number of policy responses’ characteristics. Analogous
to Swanson (2017) for the US, the six and twelve months eonia swap provide a good estimate
of market expectations on the future path of rates over the one year horizon. German bonds
grant information on longer horizons’ risk premia and interest rate expectations. Additionally,
the one year inflation swap conveys market expectations on the inflation rate in that horizon.
Simultaneously, the equity and spread indices both convey expectations on economic perfor-
mance, whereas the latter also depicts credit risk premia. The economic information provided
during announcements is studied by Jarocinski and Karadi (2018) as an information channel
and is shown to have a meaningful impact on business conditions’ prospects. Lastly, the one
month eonia swap is used as a proxy for predictions on short term rates, being crucial for our
analysis.
These interpretations are supported by Kuttner (2001) who shows that such future type
assets are able to gauge market’s expectations and, therefore, isolate the unexpected component
of policy, which is what we are ultimately interested in.
10When one adds, for example, Italian bonds, which all have a higher than 30% correlation with high maturity
german bonds during the sample, or other maturities for the already included assets.
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4.2 Constructing a Proxy Series for Non-standard Policy
The factors estimated before, nonetheless, do not have any straightforward meaning, as they are
simply data-driven structures. One way of circumventing such problem, introduced by GSS, is
to rotate these latent structures such that they offer the desired structural interpretation. Take F
to be the 111×3 matrix of latent factors estimated using principal components. We can rotate
the factors using a 3× 3 orthogonal matrix U , generating a new matrix of unobserved factors,
Z:
Z = FU. (11)
Notice that this rotation preserves the variation explained by the factors11. Concurrently, the
rotated factors remain orthogonal to each other.
It is straightforward to show that we need to set three restrictions on the (orthogonal) ro-
tation matrix in order to have it uniquely defined. With such purpose, I follow a very similar
approach to that of Swanson (2017). The first two restrictions are crucial in reaching our goal
of constructing an instrument(s) that only portray unexpected changes to non-standard mea-
sures. With that objective in mind, remember that the one month eonia swap depicts agents’
expectations on the next month’s short term interest rate. Following GSS, we thus isolate two
factors12, Z2 and Z3, from explaining any change in this rate. Essentially, we want them to rep-
resent all other aspects of announcements that do not move the current short rate. Consequently,
they should only reflect alternative actions or, more broadly speaking, non-standard monetary
actions built to affect longer term maturities, such as forward guindace or most of the asset pur-
chase programmes. The remaining factor, Z1, is referred to in this literature as the target factor
and should be the only one affecting the short rate. The choice of the first factor, F1, which
explains the most variability, to depict conventional measures is based on the fact that these,
on top of being present in almost the whole sample, were already familiar to the public whom,
consequently, should have more predictable and systematic reactions to them.
Contrarily to Swanson (2017), whose rotated factors each uniquely represent either forward
11The 9×3 matrix of factor loadings is also rotated: Λ∗ = ΛU . This means that the common components of the
data will now be: X = ZΛ∗′ = (FU)(ΛU)′ = FUU ′Λ′ = FΛ′, exactly as before the rotation. We used here the fact
that U is orthogonal.
12Referred to as UMP factors hereafter.
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guidance or large asset purchases, it must be reinforced that this transformation simply differen-
tiates between the target factor and the other two, removing the unexpected changes in the short
rate. Therefore, it offers no structural interpretation to any of them specifically and both together
represent the mix of non-standard policies systematically observed in the announcements.
Mathematically, the two restrictions require us to set the value of the asset’s loadings on the
two factors to 0, so that these are not responsible for any of its variability:
i. Λ1U2 = 0, ii. Λ1U3 = 0,
where Λ1 is the first row of the factor loadings, corresponding to the loads of the one month
eonia swap. U2 and U3 correspond to the second and third column, respectively, of the rotation
matrix. Again, so that the asset does not load on the factors, these transformations, representing
the newly generated loadings, must be equal to zero.
This is sufficient to isolate non-standard actions as we intended. It does not, however,
uniquely define the rotation matrix. For that, I resort to an ad hoc procedure. Note that even
though the eonia had reached negative ground before, the European Central Bank reached its
effective zero lower bound on the 16th of March when it set the deposit facility to -40 basis
points and the fixed rate tender for main refinancing operations to 0. As a consequence, it is
safe to assume that the target factor, which represents expectations on such policies, should
be the least responsible for moving the markets after such date, as the central bank had extin-
guished their usefulness. Consequently, I set the third restriction so as to minimize the target
factor’s variability13:
iii. Minimize
U1
U1′Felb
′FelbU1,
where U1 is the first column of the rotation matrix and Felb are the estimated factors after the
16th of March.
Given these three restrictions, the orthogonal matrix U is uniquely defined and can then be
found by solving the following quadratic programming problem with quadratic constraints:
Minimize
U1
U1′Felb
′
FelbU1
subject to Λ1U2 = 0, Λ1U3 = 0, U ′U = I3,
(12)
13Represented by the sum of squares.
14
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2018
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
Sta
nda
rd D
evia
tion
s
Target Factor
UMP Factor 1
UMP Factor 2
Figure 1: Rotated factors, expressed in standard deviations.
which is easily and only solvable through numerical methods, available in any computational
package. Notice that the third constraint represents the orthogonality condition of the rotation
matrix. The resulting factors, scaled by their standard deviations, are plotted in figure 1. I
change their signs such that a positive value indicates a negative change in the one year eonia
swap.
It first stands out the existence of three volatility clusters. The first starts in 2008 and lasts
up to 2009, spanning most of the financial crisis period. The second, from 2011 to late 2012,
portrays the sovereign crisis while the third, from mid 2015 to early 2016, shows the furthering
of the quantitative easing program(s). Although by construction, it is relevant to observe that
the target factor not only decreases its importance after 2016 but that it is also not always the
predominant factor during the sample.
Furthermore, it is worth describing the 8th of October 2008’s press release, the peak of the
target factor, when the bank announced an easing policy, in cooperation with a group of other
central banks, to provide liquidity to the financial system until required, as a response to the
global financial crisis. On that same note, on the 4th of January 2011 the president announced an
extension of the bond purchase programme and a special long-term refinancing operation with
the intent of granting liquidity to the financial system, surprising the markets positively, as can
be noted by the first UMP factor’s value. Contrarily, at first sight, the highly negative reaction
on the 12th of December 2015, most notably for the first UMP factor, might seem startling.
Nonetheless, this reaction reflects the lower than expected package of measures to fight low
inflation in the euro area, as one may conclude from the first question in the announcement
Q&A: ”...it seems like what you’ve done is a little bit on the low end of the range of what
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the financial markets had expected...Why didn’t you raise the monthly purchase amount? Why
didn’t you cut the deposit rate more?”.
The series generated needs to now be extended to the same monthly frequency as the empir-
ical macroeconomic model. In order to do so, we follow the same methodology as Gertler and
Karadi (2015). This extension method has two important properties. It, first, gives more em-
phasis to shocks occurring in the beginning of the month and, second, allows them to propagate
for a given period of time. Intuitively, a shock striking in the beginning of the month should
have a higher recorded impact than if that same shock hit the economy at the end of that period.
At the same time, the shock’s effects propagate into the future. Again, an unexpected change at
the end of the period should have an impact on the next months’ performance, as much of the
reactions take time to materialize.
That being said, the extension proceeds as follows. For every day of the year, one first
computes the cumulative sum of shocks until that date. In my method, the start of the sum
depends on the month of the date. For example, if the day in question is in May, then one
computes the cumulative sum of the shocks between that date and the past 29 days. After, one
takes the average of these daily values for each month, resulting in the monthly series of shocks.
4.3 The effects of Monetary Policy Announcements on Asset Prices
I now try to uncover the resulting factors by studying how unexpected changes in the mix of
monetary policy affect asset prices on days of policy announcements. To do so, I follow an event
study methodology around the aforementioned time window and run the following regression
using Ordinary Least Squares:
Yi,t = α+β1Z1,t +β2Z2,t +β3Z3,t +υi,t , (13)
where the dependent variable is the change in the asset’s index value and the independent vari-
ables are the estimated factors, on the 111 announcement dates. For the coefficients’ p-values,
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors are used. The results of regres-
sion (13) are reported in tables 1, 2 and 3.
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Table 1: Event Regression Results for swaps.
Constant Target Factor UMP Factor 1 UMP Factor 2 R2
(std. err.) (std. err.) (std. err.) (std. err.)
eonia swaps - 1M .0063∗∗∗ −.0208∗∗∗ −.0001 .0003 .53
(.0024) (.0043) (.0032) (.0032)
eonia swaps - 6M .0023∗ −.0213∗∗∗ −.0118∗∗∗ −.0148∗∗∗ .92
(.0013) (.0020) (.0007) (.0016)
eonia swaps - 1Y .0011 −.0208∗∗∗ −.0212∗∗∗ −.0223∗∗∗ .90
(.0021) (.0022) (.0012) (.0031)
eonia swaps - 5Y .0074∗∗ .0021 −.0343∗∗∗ −.0024 .81
(.0030) (.0021) (.0025) (.0056)
eonia swaps - 10Y .0049 .0139∗∗∗ −.0314∗∗∗ .0036 .66
(.0034) (.0027) (.0030) (.0072)
Inflation swaps - 1Y .0045 .0300∗∗∗ .0068∗∗ .0529∗∗∗ .77
(.0039) (.0028) (.0029) (.0061)
Inflation swaps - 3Y .0036 .0006 .0092∗∗∗ .0098 .18
(.0040) (.0050) (.0034) (.0071)
Inflation swaps - 5Y .0056∗∗ −.0008 .0046∗∗ .0019 .09
(.0027) (.0040) (.0020) (.0039)
Inflation swaps - 10Y .0045∗∗ .0000 .0065∗∗∗ .0004 .19
(.0022) (.0026) (.0020) (.0036)
*,**,*** indicates statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% significance level, respectively.
As predicted from the rank test, the results show that the factors behave independently from
each other. For that matter, note that there are assets, such as the investment grade bonds index,
that respond only to the two UMP factors, but not to the target factor. Furthermore, note that
even those that are only affected by unconventional monetary policy may solely be affected by
one of those two factors.
More specifically, with the exception of the 10 year eonia swap, note that both the eonia and
inflation swaps, as maturity increases, seem to become more affected by unconventional mon-
etary policy as the target factor turns statistically insignificant. Moreover, notice that at longer
maturities only the first UMP factor remains meaningful in moving expectations. The second
UMP factor appears to depict a more specific effect, affecting only (shorter) intermediate ma-
turities, both on the eonia and inflation swaps. As expected, when expectations on intermediate
rates decrease, inflation expectations increase due to the former’s expansionary character.
In contrast, while the second UMP factor turns insignificant at longer maturities, german
bond yields seem to remain affected by the target factor. Swanson (2017) too has similar re-
sults. The author also records a negative relationship between the treasury yield’s maturity and
significance of the forward guidance factor. In contrast, he finds a positive relationship with
respect to the large asset purchases factor.
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Table 2: Event Regression Results for Bond Yields.
Constant Target Factor UMP Factor 1 UMP Factor 2 R2
(std. err.) (std. err.) (std. err.) (std. err.)
Italian Bonds - 6M −.0071 −.0297∗∗∗ .0032 −.0098∗ .40
(.0052) (.0068) (.0045) (.0058)
Italian Bonds - 5Y −.0053 −.0141∗ .0011 −.0257∗∗∗ .08
(.0080) (.0083) (.0128) (.0098)
Italian Bonds - 10Y .0007 −.0048 .0000 −.0271∗∗ .07
(.0083) (.0065) (.0115) (.0128)
Italian Bonds - 20Y .0007 −.0046 .0025 −.0198∗ .05
(.0069) (.0056) (.0086) (.0105)
German Bonds - 1Y −.0068∗ −.0155∗∗ −.0206∗∗∗ −.0200∗∗∗ .76
(.0038) (.0048) (.0020) (.0039)
German Bonds - 5Y −.0027∗ .0047∗∗∗ −.0384∗∗∗ .0045∗∗∗ .94
(.0015) (.0013) (.0012) (.0016)
German Bonds - 10Y −.0002 .0165∗∗∗ −.0358∗∗∗ .0092∗∗ .86
(.0022) (.0015) (.0020) (.0041)
German Bonds - 20Y .0032 .0150∗∗∗ −.0301∗∗∗ .0112 .70
(.0029) (.0024) (.0026) (.0046)
*,**,*** indicates statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% significance level, respectively.
The effect of both target and second UMP factors is, nonetheless, counter-intuitive as one
would expect a co-movement between the whole yield curve. What we observe in turn, is that
an expansionary policy, measured by the one month eonia swap decrease, increases the yield of
German bonds with maturity above one year.
Focusing on longer maturity Italian bonds, despite the lower explanatory power, it is note-
worthy to mention that only the second UMP factor remains statistically significant, while the
first never is. Additionally, the target factor loses significance after five years of maturity.
Contrarily to bunds, not only do the second UMP coefficients’ signs for Italian bonds seem
to agree with the expansionary character of the others, but these remain significant for higher
maturities in comparison.
Similarly surprising, equities14 seem to be solely affected by the target factor, with the same
sign as that of the eonia swap. In turn, the bond index only answers to unconventional monetary
policy, albeit with different signs between factors. Some of these results seem to be at odds with
our understanding of monetary policy.
Firstly, all factors would be expected to have a meaningful impact on both types of as-
sets. Swanson (2017), though, also finds that US corporates bond yields and spreads only re-
spond to unconventional monetary policy. Contrarily, the author finds that the forward guidance
14The coefficients’ size derives from the index magnitude. The standardization of the data to compute the factors
implies that we do not need to do any transformation to the index’s values.
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Table 3: Event Regression Results for Private Indices and Exchange Rates.
Constant Target Factor UMP Factor 1 UMP Factor 2 R2
(std. err.) (std. err.) (std. err.) (std. err.)
Equity Index −3.339 −18.635∗∗∗ 3.135 1.636 .53
(2.048) (3.403) (1.925) (2.874)
Investment Grade Bonds OAS Index −.0024 −.0017 −.0122∗∗∗ .0170∗∗∗ .64
(.0019) (.0013) (.0016) (.0035)
EUR/USD −.0005 .0000 −.0045∗∗∗ .0003 .51
(.0008) (.0008) (.0005) (.0008)
EUR/CHF −.0001 −.0003 −.0023∗∗∗ .0009 .43
(.0004) (.0003) (.0004) (.0008)
EUR/GBP .0001 .0005 −.0020∗∗∗ −.0004 .38
(.0004) (.0004) (.0003) (0.0004)
*,**,*** indicates statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% significance level, respectively.
factor also explains the US’s equity index movements.
Secondly, the bonds spread index, capturing mainly corporate bonds, shows an increase in
the spread from an expansionary policy for the second UMP factor. This would not be expected,
specially considering the corporate purchase programs, which should work in the opposite di-
rection. Nevertheless, it is true that the bunds also respond positively to this component.
Thirdly, notice that the target factor coefficient’s sign for equities is again at odds with what
one would expect. Notwithstanding, this stylized fact is also denoted in the work of Jarocinski
and Karadi (2018). They observe that equities consistently do not respond to monetary policy
as one would infer from the eonia swap movements, attributing this to economic information
conveyed during announcements. This fact leads us to two preliminary conclusions. Firstly, it
reinforces my previous statement that the two UMP factors only include systematic informa-
tion that is not responsible for moving the short rate. Secondly, it shows that the target factor
may include more information regarding monetary policy than just conventional measures. As
such, it will most likely provide similar results to the literature who only uses an eonia swap to
measure policy surprises.
Finally, the exchange rates do react to unconventional monetary policy, although this effect
is only statistically significant for the first UMP factor. This finding in particular, adds evidence
supporting the effect of non-standard measures on foreign exchange markets, although only due
to one facet of these. Swanson (2017), in contrast, finds that every factor affects the US dollar’s
exchange rate. In addition, the effect is qualitatively homogeneous across currencies and is
according to theory, where an expansionary policy should and does decrease the nominal value
19
of the euro against other currencies.
All in all, these results constitute evidence that the two UMP factors merely represent non-
standard measures. In particular, the first UMP factor seems to be in accordance with the
presented literature on the financial effects of unconventional policy. The second UMP factor,
instead, appears to be more specific and not easily identifiable from previous studies. Fur-
thermore, the target factor suffers from a pitfall already denoted in previous work. A possible
solution would be to use further ad hoc assumptions, although doing this would harm our ap-
proach’s simplicity. Finally, it might be the case that some information on atypical measures is
included in the target factor.
5 Data, Estimation and Results
In this section I first present the data used together with the results from the benchmark SVAR
model. More details on transformations and data sources are provided in appendix. After, I
delve deeper into the mechanisms of transmission of large scale asset purchases. Along the
section I compare my results with those of previous literature.
5.1 Benchmark SVAR: Large Scale Asset Purchases
The period after the financial crisis is still relatively short to conduct a quarterly macroeconomic
analysis. I, therefore, use monthly data in order to examine the effects of large scale asset
purchases, as portrayed by our constructed instrument(s), on the euro area aggregate economy.
The working dataset, i.e., disregarding the lags in the model and the differences taken, span
from January 2009 to March 2018 and comprises 111 observations.
Given the continuous use of asset purchases and our intermediate results, it must be that
at least one of our UMP factors portrays central bank’s balance sheet size measures. In order
to test such claim, I construct a benchmark SVAR model using public information on the total
value of the ECB’s assets15.
15I do not include the eonia rate as policy tool since it requires more lags than our data would permit. I provide
the results of the model in appendix, using only 3 lags. The results do not change and the interest rate falls
throughout.
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Aggregate macroeconomic and sectoral accounts at a monthly frequency are not available
at the euro aggregate level. As a result, we resort to the index of total industrial production as a
proxy for output. For prices, we use the total harmonized consumer price index (hcpi) excluding
energy and food.
I choose here to add the non-adjusted reference price for crude oil in Europe, the Brent.
The common small-scale SVAR model used to analyse monetary policy tends to suffer from
the well-known price puzzle. Leeper et al. (1996) point out that this is due to the exclusion of
forward-looking variables. These are very important for the central bank’s reaction function as
expectation management is a crucial task of said institution. Commodity prices are known to
have such property and may act as a solution to this problem.
I use the Akaike, Bayesian information and Hanna-Quinn criteria to determine the number
of lags. The first two indicate a model of order one whereas the latter points for a three lagged
system. I take the latter and use 3 lags. The resulting estimates are obviously stationary and
the residuals show no statistically significant signs of autocorrelation, even up to one and a half
years, supporting our choice.
In order to determine the validity of my instruments, I regress them individually on each
residual of the model. The first stage F-statistics provides statistical evidence, at the 1% sig-
nificance level, for the relevance of the target and first UMP factors. It, therefore, invalidates
the use of the second UMP factor as an external instrument for large scale asset purchases. The
regression on first UMP factor has an r-squared of 12.4% while that of the target factor is of
9.0%. Contrarily to the first UMP factor, the latter does not respect the necessary assumption
of exogeneity due to its statistically significant coefficient for the hcpi, presenting a very high
F-statistic. These results provide further evidence that the factor may explain more than just
unexpected conventional monetary policy measures. As a result, we may also not make use
of it for identification purposes. Consequently, I use the first UMP factor as a proxy variable,
proven to respect all the required assumptions for our purpose.
The structural IRFs16 to an expansionary 25 basis points shock of the ECB’s balance sheet
are displayed in figure 2. I include one standard deviation confidence bands that result from a
16Cumulative IRFs are presented if the series were first differenced.
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Figure 2: Structural IRFs to an expansionary 25 bp balance sheet shock, benchmark SVAR.
wild bootstrap using a standard normal distribution and 5000 iterations, following Djogbenou
et al. (2015). Given a strong instrument like mine, this approach is valid even in the presence
of heterogeneity. Both stages of the methodology are included, thus, avoiding, as Gertler and
Karadi (2015) point out, any ’regressed generator’ problems.
As a validation of this method, I first highlight the absence of both the price and output
puzzle. In fact, contrarily to previous literature findings, the latter increase shows more inertia
than that of the former which reacts within the period. Price’s error bands, nevertheless, remain
positive for almost 4 months while the latter’s, simultaneously, never are. Both appear to be
level effects, as they remain at their peak for at least two years. Contrarily to some ’fears’,
the full effects of this policy on prices appear to materialize immediately. Besides, the results
exhibit a neutrality property of the balance sheet size policy since production is not significantly,
both economically and statistically, affected by it.
5.2 Transmission Channels
We now set out to understand what transmission channels for large scale asset purchases may
be at play. In order to do so, our baseline approach, common to the rest of the small-scale
VAR literature, is to alternate individually between the variables of interest, adding them as a
fifth variable to the benchmark model. We may then inspect their respective structural impulse
response functions to the same expansionary balance sheet shock as in the previous subsection.
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Figure 3: Structural IRFs to a 0.25 balance sheet shock, fifth variable SVAR.
All results are displayed in figure 3.
I first highlight the activation of the portfolio rebalancing channel as evidenced from the
decrease in the long term bund yield, which I use as a proxy for safe assets. In order for this
channel to work, it must be that safer assets suffer a depression in yield, as we observe here,
so as to offer lower returns to investors and subsequently incentivize for a portfolio reshuffling.
Nonetheless, this channel can only be deemed successful if it actually materializes into a quest
for alternative assets.
To check this outcome I focus on equities, while also inspecting financial sector’s market
returns and market uncertainty. With that goal in mind, I resort to the Volatility STOXX, the
STOXX50 and the financials STOXX indices which portray volatility and equity returns in the
euro area, respectively. Both series provide a clear picture against financial markets benefit-
ing from the policy. Starting with uncertainty, we find the same result as in previous litera-
ture, which surprisingly shows an enlarging in volatility. This result, therefore, contradicts the
argument that quantitative easing, among other potential channels, works by diminishing un-
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certainty. On top of this, we observe that both the broad equity and the financial sector equity
indices decrease on impact, as well as through time. The financial sector like it has been argued,
has not benefited from an environment of low interest rates and decreasing margins, thus, ex-
plaining this result. The equity market’s result is more puzzling as asset prices should increase
given the crowding out effect on safer assets or the decrease of interest rates. This offers further
evidence against some sign restrictions presented in section 2.
Last for security markets, we turn to the exchange rate channel and verify that this is clearly
activated, depressing immediately on impact and remaining as such for the rest of the period.
Turning to real effects, I analyse the pass-through of extra liquidity in the financial system
to credit for the public. In order to assess its impact, I inspect both the cost and volume of credit
in the economy. This allows us to understand if this credit easing policy actually materializes
into better credit conditions for the economic system. To assess the cost of credit, I use the
annualized agreed rate for consumption of the household sector in the euro area17. Additionally,
for the volume of credit I use the monthly flow of loans to both households and non-financial
corporations, summed together.
Offering fresh results on this topic, both series provide a clear picture against more favourable
credit conditions. Neither the flow nor the cost of credit appear to significantly change, remain-
ing near their steady state values throughout. These results seem to portray the state of the
euro area after the beginning of the quantitative easing programmes, when we could not really
conclude for facilitated credit from MFIs to the real economy.
An alternative but similarly important mechanism of transmission is that of expectations. As
such, I use two indicators, one depicting business prospects and the other inflation outlooks. The
first is the eurozone’s business index and the second an inflation expectations index. The first
indicates that business expectations actually decrease on impact, in the virtue of an expansionary
policy. Contrarily, the inflation expectations index appears to rise, even though the error bands
still capture its steady state value. Both series appear not to suffer a significant impact when
considering a longer horizon and offer proof that if this channel is activated, it is very mildly so.
Methodologically though, we may not ignore the fact that the external instrument is ex-
17The results are in everything similar to using an equivalent rate but for house purchase reasons.
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tremely correlated with the long term bund yields, the exchange rate and the equity indices - as
one would predict from section 4 - which will extensively bias the results. Therefore, as a ro-
bustness check, I estimate our benchmark model using these variables as policy indicators, one
at a time, in place of the balance sheet variable. The subsequent responses are defined solely by
the external identification method, thus, depicting this same expansionary non-standard mea-
sure. Subsequently, we may shock each of them negatively, as observed here, and confirm
that the results are similar overall, with a significant rise in prices and a mild effect on output.
Adding to the obvious relevance depicted by the very high F-statistic, this robustness check
grants us reassurance of our previous conclusions’ validity.
6 Conclusion
Resorting to an agnostic methodology, I provide evidence contradicting previous results on
asset purchases’ effects in the euro area. More specifically, we neither document a rise in equity
prices nor improved business expectations. Similarly, credit conditions do not really benefit
from an expansion of the balance sheet size. Nonetheless, to the advantage of policy making,
this measure may be neutral since we do not witness a significant reaction from real production.
These results are, nevertheless, case-specific and cannot be generalized for every central
bank. Even though we are focusing only on size, composition and, thus, the particular type of
asset purchases, which are not controlled for explicitly here but arguably done so by the external
instrument, matter. As a result, conclusions could be changed were asset purchases conducted
differently.
The failure to obtain additional data, among other, related to corporate bonds and credit
spreads, has prevented me from both extinguishing every potential transmission mechanism
predicted in the theoretical literature and delving deeper into those briefly studied here. This
means there is still ground for deeper research on these matters.
To conclude, in terms of the specific methodology, even though we were able to extract
valuable information from policy announcements, it must be restated that we fail to offer a
complete interpretation of every dimension retrieved. Therefore, a need to further study several
of the ECB’s communication facets stems from our statistical exercise.
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Appendices
A Dataset
This appendix contains a list of the series in our dataset with information regarding transforma-
tions made, seasonal adjustments and sources. All data are of monthly frequency and span from
September 2008 to March 2018. All variables cover the euro area, either all the 19 countries or
the ECB’s (changing) coverage definition. Abbreviations and codes are as follows:
Transformations:
1 - None
2 - First Differenced
4 - Logarithmized
5 - Logarithmized and First Differenced
Seasonal Adjustment:
WDSA - Calendar and Seasonally Adjusted
SA - Seasonally but not Calendar Adjusted
NSA - Neither Seasonally nor Calendar Adjusted
Source:
EC - European Comission
Description Transformation Seasonal Adjustment Source
Index of Total Industrial Production 5 WDSA ECB sdw
The Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices
Total Excluding Energy and Food 5 WDSA ECB sdw
Crude Oil Prices: Brent
Europe - Monthly Average, Dollars per Barrel 5 NSA FRED
Eurosystem Balance Sheet
Total Assets - End of Period 5 NSA ECB sdw
Euro vs Dollar Spot Exchange Rate
Monthly Average 5 NSA ECB sdw
20-year German Bunds’ Yields
Monthly Average 1 NSA ECB sdw
Euro-zone Business Climate Indicator
Monthly Data 5 SA EC
Consumer Opinion Surveys:
Future Tendency for Inflation - Euro Area 5 SA FRED
Dow Jones Euro Stoxx 50 Price Index
Monthly Average 5 NSA Datastrem
Dow Jones Euro Stoxx Financials Index
Monthly Average 5 NSA Datastrem
Euro Stoxx 50 Volatility Index
Monthly Sum 5 NSA STOXX
Loans to NFC and Households 5 WDSA ECB sdw
Annual percentage rate of charge,
Loans for consumption excluding
revolving loans and overdrafts,
convenience and extended credit
card debt - Monthly Average 2 WDSA ECB sdw
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B Additional Impulse Response Functions
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Figure 4: Structural IRFs to an expansionary 25 bp balance sheet shock, benchmark SVAR + Eonia.
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Figure 5: Structural IRFs to a -25 bp 20-year german bund shock, robustness check.
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Figure 6: Structural IRFs to a -25 bp exchange rate shock, robustness check.
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Figure 7: Structural IRFs to a -25 bp overall equity index shock, robustness check.
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Figure 8: Structural IRFs to a -25 bp financial sector’s equity index shock, robustness check.
31
